The results of the analysis indicate that the existence of unindexed pensions and fixed annuities is not at all surprising. Even without Social Security, it may be optimal to have a completely unindexed private pension and i•t; is generally not optimal to have a completely indexed pension.
The availability of an optimal (or greater than optimal) amount of Social Security generally reduces the desired degree of indexing and, under a variety of conditions, makes it optimal to have no indexing at all in the private pension.
Because unexpected changes in the price level do not alter the value of Social Security pensions, the existence of inflation uncertainty makes a Social Security pension optimal when it would not otherwise be and an increase in inflation uncertainty is likely to increase the optimal reliance on Social Security. But despite these conclusions, the analysis shows that including some Social Security in an overall pension program is necessarily optimal only when both money market instruments and Social Security have rates of return that are known with certainty. When the real yield on money market instruments is uncertain, the optimal pension arrangement may be a partially indexed private pension even though Social Security is risk-free and has a return that is higher than the expected rate on the money market instrunents. Similarly, when Social Security is risky, the optimal arrangement may be to exclude Social Security and to use a partially indexed private pension. In all cases, an individual who has a low enough degree of risk aversion will prefer no Social Security and a completely unindexed private pension. benefits, these adjustments have almost always been far less than the rise in the price level.
Since retirees obviously care about their real incomes, it is a puzzle that, after more than a decade of rapid inflation, private pensions are still fixed in nominal terms. Why have employers and employees until now not negotiated pension benefits that are indexed or partly indexed to the price level?
Alternatively, why have employee pensions not taken the form of variable annuities based on floating rate instruments whose nominal yield varies in the short-run with the rate of inflation (Bodie, 1980a,b) ?-Does current behavior represent a mistake by employees and unions that makes it appropriate * Professor of Economics, Harvard University, and President, National Bureau of Economic Research. This paper is part of the NBER Study of Public and Private Pensions. I am grateful to participants in the study for comments on an earlier version of this paper.
The key issue is the employee's risk of uncertain inflation. It would not really be indexing if, instead of a constant nominal annual benefit, the benefit rises at a rate that is fixed at the time of retirement. Although the increase in benefits might be related to the expected rate of inflation, the employee would continue to bear the entire risk of unexpected changes in inflation. I shall reserve the term "indexing" for mechanisms that reduce the uncertainty of real benefits by linking benefits either to the price level or to the yield on short-term money market instruments.
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-2-in some sense to modify the laws governing pensions to require such indexing?
The present paper shows that the existing arrangement with purely nominal private pensions may in fact be optimal in the presence of the indexed system of Social Security retirement pensions. Of course, since an individual who relies on a nominal pension is in effect making a risky investment, there will be unexpected losses and gains. The recent losses by retirees should be seen as just such an unfortunate ex post outcome and not as an indication that private pensions are either incompatible with inflation or should be indexed.
Because protection against inflation risk can only be obtained at the cost of accepting a lower expected rate of return,1 the potential retiree will generally choose to be less than fully protected against inflation, i.e., will choose a partially indexed pension. Moreover, Social Security retirement benefits provide a fully indexed pension that replaces a substantial fraction of previous peak earnings for most current retirees.2 The combination of Social Security and a private pension thus provides a total pension arrangement that is substantially indexed even if the private pension is fixed in nominal terms. For most 1 Pesando (1981) discusses a very different sense in which it is expensive to maintain the real value of pension benefits: keeping the same initial pension benefit and then raising benefits in proportion to the price level clearly increases the expected value of benefits in all subsequent years. My emphasis is on reducing the variance around any expected real stream of benefits. A lower real variance requires investing in assets with a lower expected return and thus increases the cost (i.e., the initial value of assets) required to provide any expected stream of real benefits.
2 An employee who has had median earnings for all of his working life now retires at age 65 with a Social Security pension that replaces more than 1.o percent of his peak pretax earnings. If he is married and his wife does not claim benefits on the basis of her own income, his benefit will be increased to more than 60 percent of his peak pretax earnings. Since these benefits are not subject to income or payroll tax, they replace more than 15 percent of after tax earnings. Since Social Security is indexed by the Consumer Price Index, it is probably overindexed with respect to a true variable-weight measure of retirees' cost of living.
-3-employees, the extent of indexing in the combined pension may be such that no indexing of the private pension would be desired.'
The analysis in this paper makes these ideas more precise and proves specific conclusions. Although the models employed are clearly a simplification of reality, I believe that they capture the essential features of the problem.
The first section of the paper analyzes an economy without Social Security in which all retirement consumption is financed by a private pension. In section 2, Social Security is introduced and the analysis examines the optimal mix of Social Security and private pensions as well as the optimal indexing of private pensions. The third section extends this analysis to a Social Security program with uncertain benefits.2 There is then a brief concluding section.
Optimal Pension Indexing without Social Security
The simplest framework within which to analyze the problem of pension indexing is a two-period two-asset model. Employees work in the first period and contribute an amount C to a retirement pension. In the second period of their life, employees are retired and then receive a pension with real (but generally uncertain) value P.
For employees with very high earnings, Social Security benefits are low relative to private pension benefits and the degree of overall indexing of the cornbined pension is therefore correspondingly low. Although such employees may prefer to have some indexing of their pension benefits, the legal rules for tax deductible ("qualified") pensions presumably prevents "discriminating" among different classes of employees. Moreover, high income employees tend to have additional portfolio assets and liabilities with which to achieve the overall desired degree of indexing (although generally with less favorable tax treatment). For some lower wage employees the opposite is true; the combined pension provides too niich indexing. I return to these below.
2 All of the analysis ignores other forms of individual wealth. The vast majority of retirees depend almost completely on the combination of social security and other pension income. Additional assets generally consist of only an owner-occupied home and a small amount of liquid precautionary balances.
_14 -
In a "defined contribution" type of pension plan, employee: inve:t their pension contributions in a portfolio of bonds and corporate stock. '1hen they retire, they receive an annuity based on the value of these assets. Since the value of bonds and their interest payments are fixed in nominal terms, the real rate of return of the bond portion varies inversely with changes in both the price level and the rate of inflation. Although the real value of corporate stock should be unaffected by changes in the price level, changes in the expected rate of inflation do cause changes in real share values.' Thus the real value of a defined contribution pension invested in any combination of bonds and stocks is uncertain.
In the more common "defined benefit" type of pension, the employer invests the contrfbutions and promises the employee benefits that depend on the employee's final year's earnings and that then remain fixed in nominal terms.2
In the simplest interpretation of the defined benefit plan, the retired employee has a fixed nominal annuity that is analogous to a bond. Because the firm can invest the pension funds in a mix of bonds that exactly matches the benefit obligation, the firm provides this bond yield to the retiree. Although firms may in fact invest pension assets in a mix of stocks and bonds, the equity owners of the firm receive the excess return (if any) generated in this way in exchange for accepting the extra risk of a non-hedged investment. ore generally, however, the employee in a defined benefit plan may receive benefits that depend on the performance of the pension fund. This is 1 See, e.g., Feldstein (l980a, 1980b) , Hendershott and Ru (1979) and Summers (1981a) .
2 The nature of the obligation and of the investment is actually more complicated in practice. The employer is technically only obligated to provide for the "vestedt' benefits that are based on existing service. But to prevent a rapid increase in pension costs as employees approach retirement, employers often anticipate future expected pension obligations. Some firms, however, do not fully fund even their vested obligations but substitute an implicit corporate promise. See Feldstein (1981) .
true not only because a low enough value of fund assets can reduce benefits below the promised level but also because successful pension performance can lead to increases in the promised level of benefits and ad hoc "voluntary" increases in benefits to retirees.' In what follows, I do not distinguish between defined benefit and defined contribution plans.
Although virtually all private pensions are unindexed, this is not necessary. Zvi Bodie (1980a,b) has recently shown that assets invested in a sequence of three-month Treasury bills provide a very good inflation hedge.2
Thus, individuals in a defined contribution plan can achieve an essentially risk-free real return by investing in bills and an employer who manages a defined benefit plan can offer an essentially indexed pension without additional risk to shareholders by investing in such bills.
I shall denote the real return on bills as the random variable rb with mean b and variance cb. If this type of investment provides a perfect index asset, there is no correlation between rb and the inflation rate. In some of the analysis that follows, I shall make the stronger assumption that rb is a constant (ub = 0). Bodie's empirical analysis showed that the return on the See Bulow (1981) , Miller and Scholes (1981) and Pesando (1981) on the beneficial interest of employees in the pension fund. Similarly, I shall denote the real yield on the completely unindexed pension by the random variable r with mean and variance au. This yield can be interpreted as the yield that is implicit in setting the level of the nominal annuity of a strict defined benefit plan, or as the ex post yield on the mix of debt and equity in a defined contribution plan, or as the ex post yield on a performance-related defined benefit plan.
The real value of the employee's pension in retirement is given by
where C is the pension contribution, U is the amount of the contribution that purchases an unindexed pension (of either the defined contribution or defined benefit type) and C-U is the "indexed" portion represented by an investment in bills. The employee's problem in designing a pension is thus similar to a portfolio allocation problem, i.e., selecting the value of U that maximizes the employee's expected utility of retirement consumption E [v(p)] subject to the constraint implied by equation 1.1.1 I shall assume throughout the analysis that short-sales of either asset are not permitted; thus, C > U 0.
1 In principle, the employee decides the size of the pension contribution and the form of investment simultaneously. The present analysis takes the size of contribution as given.
If the returns (ru and rb) are normally distributed (or if the individual's utility function can be approximated by a quadratic function), the individual's preferences can be represented graphically by a set of indifference curves in terms of the mean and standard deviation of the portfolio's terminal value (Tobin, 1958) . Figure 1 combines these indifference curves with the opportunity locus in the important case in which investment in "bills" provides a fully indexed pension with zero mean return.
Consider first the line connecting the origin with point U. The origin represents a pension fund invested exclusively in bills (and is therefore marked with the letter b). Since there is no uncertainty about the real return on these assets, the standard deviation of the pension benefit is zero. The pension benefit is therefore C, the initial contribution. Point U represents the pension that results when the pension is completely unindexed. Since the standard deviation of the return per dollar contributed to the unindexed pension is auu, the standard deviation of the pension benefit is Equation 1.1 implies that, for any U, the expected pension benefit is E(P) = C -U + u(i+)
The expected benefit associated with the completely unindexed pension is thus C + Uj. Any point on the straight line between the origin and U represents a feasible pension allocation.
The indifference curve tangent to the bU line at E represents preferences that lead to a partially indexed pension; any move toward more complete indexing causes a reduction in expected pension benefits that outweighs the reduction in risk. 
e., more nearly parallel to the horizontal axis) and can imply no tangency along the bU line. In this case, the optimal pension will correspond to point U with no indexing at all.' Increases in risk aversion shifts the optimum to a more fully indexed pension but, except for the case of "infinitely" risk averse individuals, the optimum will not involve a fully indexed pension.2 Thus the optimal pension will not be fully indexed and may be either partially indexed or not indexed at all.
To make these ideas more precise, consider an individual whose preferences can be represented by a constant absolute risk aversion utility function, v(P) = -with risk aversion paramenter a > 0 (Arrow, 1971) . Since the amount of the pension contribution that is unindexed is U, the value of the pension is the random amount P = C + rU. Thus, 2 Intuitively, an individual who has assumed no risk will always be willing to accept a small amount of risk in order to raise the mean return.
For any finite value of the risk aversion parameter, > 0 and the pension is less than completely indexed. Moreover, if the risk aversion and the variance are low enough relative to the expected return, the entire pension fund will be
Returning to figure 1, we can consider the effect of an increase in inflation uncertainty on the optimal extent of pension indexing. An increase in inflation uncertainty (on the assumption that bills permit complete indexing) is equivalent to an increase in the variance of the unindexed pension and therefore a shift in locus of feasible pensions from bU to bU' • At every point along bU' the tradeoff between risk and return is less favorable; a greater increase in real risk must be accepted for each increase in expected real return. Moreover, at the degree of indexing that was optimal with the lower level of inflation uncertainty (i.e., at point E' on bU' that corresponds to point Eon bU), the individual has the same expected return but more risk. It seems likely therefore that with more initial risk and a less favorable risk-return tradeoff, the individual would choose to index the pension more completely. This is shown in figure 1 where the new optimum at E2 lies closer than E' to the complete indexing point. In the constant absolute risk aversion case of equation l.1& it is also clear that an increase in causes U to fall and the optimal degree of indexing to rise.2 1 Note that a result like l.4 can be obtained with constant proportional risk aversion in continuous time models; see Bodie (1979) .
2 It is of course possible that an increase in inflation uncertainty could reduce the degree of indexing, i.e., that the indifference curve would be tangent to bU' at a point between E', and U' • This would imply that risk aversion decreased as risk increased for given yield, surely an unlikely preference.
This shift in the degree of pension indexing shows two of the adverse consequences associated with an increase in inflation uncertainty. First, in order to reduce the added risk, individuals shift their pensions to a more completely indexed form with lower expected yield. Second, even with a greater degree of indexing, the individual may have a greater risk (as shown in figure 1 ).
The lower indifference curve at E2 reflects both of these adverse consequences.
The analysis based on figure 1 (e.g., because a higher real short-term interest rate is associated with a higher nominal long rate and therefore with a fall in bond prices or in the real value of a fixed nominal annuity) 0ub < 0 and U is between zero and C, implying that the minimum variance pension is only partially indexed. This case is shown by the bU curve in figure 2 ; the point marked U indicates the minimum variance mix.
Even if the correlation between the real yields on bills and on an unindexed pension is positive, the minimum variance pension is only partly indexed if °ub < ebb, i.e., if the regression coefficient of the return on the unindexed pension on the return on bills is less than one. WtTlen this is not true, i.e., when eub ebb, the minimum variance pension is invested in bills only.1 If eub = %b' the investment opportunity locus looks like bU' in figure   2 with the minimum variance at point b. If, however, a2ub > ebb, the investment opportunity locus looks like bU" in figure 2 with an unconstrained minimum variance point that corresponds to a short position in the unindexed pension.
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As the indifference curves in figure 2 indicate, whenever a bb a ub the optimum pension will never be invested completely in the security that provides the greatest indexing. This is obvious when the minimum variance real 2 2 -return requires only partial indexing (a ub < a bb); only the portion of the bti locus between U and U is efficient since a more completely indexed pension would have both a lower expected return and greater variance. But even when the unconstructed minimum variance pension is invested in bills only (a2Ub = ebb), the optimum pension is at least partly unindexed because at point b a small increase in 1 If the constraint that prohibits short positions were relaxed, the minimum variance pension might involve a negative amount of the unindexed pension.
Bodie's calculation that the minimum variance portfolio contains only bills is actually a constrained minimum with the short sale of bonds prohibited. Bodie's calculation also assumes 11b = 0. Of course, in all three cases individuals with low enough risk aversion will prefer to have no indexing at all.
These ideas can again be made more precise by considering the special case of a constant absolute risk aversion utility function. It follows from equations 1.1 and 1.2 that -aP (c-u) bb + u a uu + 2U(Cu)a ub' 2 MaxizingE[P)l with respect to U implies:
Since the value of U that miniraizes the real variance is U = c(a2bb Since dii/dU = -1.tb) > 0, da/dll = 0.
-15-optinal pension will always have less bills (and therefore greater variance) than the ninirmim variance investment. When variations in the real yields on bills and the unindexed pension are negatively correlated (a2Ub < 0), the minimum variance U > 0 and therefore U > 0. Moreover, for a sufficiently low degree of risk aversion, U A and the pension is completely unindexed. Similarly, if 2 2 bb = aUb, U = 0 but U > 0 and, for low enough a, U ' C. Thus even when the unconstrained minimum variance pension requires investing in bills only, the optimal pension will be partly unindexed and may be completely unindexed.
2 2 Only when °bb < aub by enough to offset the yield differential ( -will the pension be invested exclusively in bills but, in that case also, the bills only portfolio does not achieve the minimum variance.
The results of this section can be summarized briefly. Even when a perfectly indexed pension can be obtained by investing pension funds in money market instruments ("bills"), individuals will always prefer a less than completely indexed pension. When bills are a risky asset, the minimum variance pension may be achieved by investing in bills only or by a partly indexed pension, depending on the regression coefficient between the unindexed pension yield and the bill yield. Individuals will, however, always prefer a pension that has more real risk than the minimum variance pension. In both cases, the individual who has a sufficiently low degree of risk aversion will want a pension that is invested exclusively in the higher yielding asset and that makes no attempt to reduce the risk of inflation.
2. Pension Indexing with Riskless Social Security As Paul Saniuelson (1958) has shown, a pay-as-you-go Social Security pension pays a real return on tax "contributions" equal to the real growth rate -'cof labor income. This is easily shown in the context of the present two-period model. P.ssuine that there are N1 workers in the current generation (denoted by the subscript i) and that each worker earns a real wage of w1. If the Social Security program imposes a tax at rate t, the total contribution of these workers is T1 = tw1N1. These funds are immediately paid out as benefits to the current retirees (i.e., the previous generation of workers). The next generation of N2 workers will earn w2N2 and pay a total tax of T2 = tv2N2 if the tax rate remains unchanged. These tax revenues will then be paid out as Social Security benefits to the current employees, B1 = tw2N2.
The relation between the taxes paid by the current generation of workers (T1) and the benefits that they subsequently receive (B1) is thus:
where y is the growth rate of real wages per employee, n is the growth rate of the labor force, and g is the growth rate of total labor income. Thus, even though Social Security contributions are not invested, participants earn a real return on their contributions in a growing econonr. In the U.S. econou during the past 30 years, total employee compensation has grown at an average annual rate of about 3 percent.1
The important feature about the Social Security program in the present context is that its pay-as-you-go character makes it automatically indexed. The 1 The rate of return on Social Security contributions during this period was substantially greater because the tax rate Ct) was increased substantially (from 0.020 in 1950 to 0.133 in 1981) . Social Security taxes are also levied only on a portion of payroll income and not on the entire employee compensation.
real tax revenue available to pay benefits may vary with productivity and with changes in population growth and labor force participation, but it does not depend on the price level. As a result, the United States and other countries with pay-as-you-go Social Security pensions promise benefits that are fully indexed to inflation.1 In this paper, I shall take the pay-as-you_go (i.e., unfunded) character of Social Security as given2 and ask how the existence of such Social Secuity benefits influence the optimal indexing of private pensions.
To begin, I shall assume that there is no uncertainty about the rate of growth of earnings (g) and therefore that Social Security can provide an indexed pension with a fixed rate of return, g. I shall examine the optimal mix of Social Security and a private pension in this case and then the effect of an arbitrarily fixed amount of Social Security on the optimal indexing of the private pension. The fourth section extends the analysis to the more general situation in which uncertainty about real growth of earnings implies uncertainty about the real return on Social Security.
The simplest case to consider is the one in which bills provide a perfect store of value with no uncertainty and a zero real return. Social Security with expected return g and no uncertainty then clearly dominates arr investment in bills. The individual prefers a combination of Social Security and a completely unindexed private pension, with the preferred combination reflecting the Before 1972, the U.S. Social Security system was not formally indexed. The law was changed occasionally to adjust the benefits of retirees but real benefits did fluctuate around a generally constant ratio of benefits to real wages.
However, it was only in the late 1960's that inflation began to appear as a serious and persistent problem for retirees.
2 The alternative would be to accuialate a Social Security fund and use its earnings to pay benefits. The working generation could guarantee the real value of benefits to retirees, varying the tax rate to obtain the necessary funds. This case is illustrated in figure 3. Point 13 corresponds to a private pension invested only in bonds and no Social Security. Point b corresponds to a fully indexed private pension invested only in bills and no Social Security. Point corresponds to Social Security only, with no private pension.
It is clear that point dominates point and that, while ar point in the triangle connecting points B, and 0 is feasible, only points on the U line are efficient. The indifference curve is drawn so that the optimal pension (at E1) is one-half Social Security and one-half an unindexed private pension.
For an individual with a constant absolute risk aversion utility function, the optimal amount of the unindexed private pension is
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where is the yield on Social Security tax contributions. The optimal amount to be contributed to Social Security is then C -1 i continue to assume that the total amount of retirement savings is fixed and divided between Social Security and the private pension. With greater initial levels of risk and a lower cost of reducing risk, the individual is likely to want to reduce risk by increasing reliance on Social Security.1
Until now, the analysis has assumed that the amount of Social Security is set optimally. If the size of the Social Security pension is instead set exogenously at a level that is less than optimal, individuals may 1 This substitution of a low yield unfunded Social Security pension for real capital formation in a funded private pension is another of the adverse consequences of increased inflation uncertainty. Someone zho was trying to develop a positive theory of the growth of Social Security benefits might note that optimal behavior required a rise in relative benefits as inflation and inflation uncertainty increased and that this is indeed what has happened in recent years. A worker with median earnings who retired at age 65 received benefits equal to about one-third of peak earnings until 1912. A change in the benefit formaila then caused the ratio to rise rapidly to more than 50 percent (in 1980) with an implied steady state value of more than 140 percent. A more historically minded student of Social Security might explain the unprecedented rise by the electoral politics of 1972 and the unintended effects of inappropriate indexing formmilae.
want to ir.dex partially their private pension. In figure 3 , the kinked line connecting points b' and U' represents the efficent frontier when the amount of the Social Security contribution is constrained to equal one-third of C. If the private pension (i.e., the amount c-s) is completely indexed, the value of the pension will be c(i + ii/3). This is shown as point ' , one third of the way between b and S. If the private pension is completely unindexed, the expected value of the pension is (C-S)(i+)+S(i+p5) and its standard deviation is (C_S)c. This is shown as point U'. If the indifference curve is tangent to the line segment b'U', the optimal private pension is partially indexed. But since the segment b'U' is steeper than SU, the indifference curve need not be tangent between b' and U'. In figure 3 , the relevant indifference curve touches the line at the kink point UTwhere the private portfolio is not indexed at all.
Although it may seem surprising that a reduction in the indexed Social Security pension does not always induce an increased indexation of the private pension, this merely reflects the fact that the private fully indexed pension has a lower yield than the Social Security pension.
If there is no riskiess private asset, the analysis of the optimal mix of Social Security and the private pension assets and of the impact of changes in the exogenously set level of Social Security is more complex. In figure 4 , the bU curve represents the purely private pension with different combinations of bills and an indexed pensions. If the value of a pure Social with no Social Security if the optimum lies on the segment XU of the private pension curve. In either case, the private pension will not be invested only in bills and will in fact contain less in bills than the minimum variance pension fund. Of course, with low risk aversion the indifference curves may not be tangent at any feasible point, implying that the optimum is a completely unindexed private pension.
Constraining the amount of Social Security to be less than the optimal amount has the same general effect when bills are risky as it does when they provide a perfect index asset. The optimal pensions may involve increased indexing or, if the individual is not very risk averse, no change in the original degree of indexing. In particular, even with the amount of Social Security reduced, a completely unindexed pension may be optimal. This is illustrated in figure 14 In the case in which the value of the pure Social Security pension would be S1, the optimum pension (at E1) consists of an equal mix of Social Security and the completely unindexed pension invested in bonds. Now constrain the amount of Social Security to be one-third of the total pension contribution: S C/3. This implies that if the private pension is completely unindexed, the total expected pension value is s(i+) + U(l+) The present section assumes that Social Security provides an uncertain pension.
Because the general case in which both bills and bonds are also uncertain assets is complex to analyze and not particularly informative, I focus on the case in which bills provide a perfect index asset with zero real return and no variance.
One example of this situation is shown in figure 5 . As usual, point represents a completely indexed private pension, point U a completely unindexed private pension, and point S no private pension but reliance only on Social Security. The shape of the SU curve, particularly the fact that the minimum variance point does not correspond to 5, implies that variations in the yield on Social Security and on bonds are either independent, negatively correlated or correlated in a weak positive way.2 Since this restriction seems to me to be rather mild, I shall not deal explicitly with the alternative case; the results are easily derived by a simple modification of figure 5.
Points along the U curve represent combinations of Social Security and a completely unindexed private pension. Points on the & line represent -I say "potential" uncertainty because the Social Security program may guarantee real benefits and allow the tax rate on employees to vary. The present U.S. legislative debate about the choice between raising taxes and reducing benefits is testing whether the "uncertainty" is "potential" or "actual". 2 The formal condition is that the regression of the unindexed pension yield on the Social Security yield be less than one. Since the efficient frontier consists of the line bX and the segment of the curve between X and U, several possible pension arrangements can immidiately be excluded as never optimal for any utility function. First, it is never optimal to rely exclusively on either Social Security (point ) or on a completely indexed private pension (point b). Further, it is never optimal to use a combination of just Social Security and a fully indexed private pension (points on line ) since a higher mean can be obtained with the same variance by using a less than fully indexed private pension.
An individual with sufficiently low risk aversion will prefer to have only a private pension and one that is not indexed at all. For such an individual, there will be no tangency on the b X U locus but the highest feasible indifference curve will touch point U. With more risk aversion, a tangency will occur along the XU curve where the individual has a combination of Social Security and a completely unindexed private pension. Only with sufficiently great risk aversion will the indifference curve tangency occur along the bX line where the individual combines Social Security with a partially indexed private pension. when tze yield on an unindexed pension is sufficiently high relative to its risk. In this case, the efficient set is just the straight line 6I3. It is never cptimal in this case to have any Social Security and the optimal private pension is either unindexed (as shown by the highest feasible indifference curve touching the U line at U) or, for a more risk averse individual, by a partly indexed private pension (with the indifference curve tangent on the &i line).
4.

Conclusion
The analysis in this paper was motivated by the apparent puzzle that, despite substantial uncertainty about future inflation rates, private pensions are almost universally unindexed. Moreover, although a variable annuity invested in short-term money market instruments provides a good inflation hedge, almost all private pensions provide a fixed annuity.
The results of the analysis indicate that the existence of unindexed pensions and fixed annuities is not at all surprising. Even without Social Security, it may be optimal to have a completely unindexed private pension and it is generally not optimal to have a completely indexed pension.
Because unexpected changes in the price level do not alter the value of Social Security pensions, the existence of inflation uncertainty makes a Social Security pension optimal when it would not otherwise be and an increase in inflation uncertainty is likely to increase the optimal reliance on Social Security. But despite these conclusions, the analysis shows that including some Social Security in an overall pension program is necessarily optimal only when both money market instruments and Social Security have rates of return that are known with certainty. When the real yield on money market instruments is uncertain, the optimal pension arrangement may be a partially indexed private pension even though Social Security is risk-free and has a return that is higher than the expected rate on the ney market instruments. Similarly, when Social Security is risky, the optimal arrangement may be to exclude Social Security and to use a partially indexed private pension. In all cases, an individual who has a low enough degree of risk aversion will prefer no Social Security and a coniplet ely unindexed private pension.
